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Abstract
We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the kernel of TU games
by means of both bilateral consistency and converse consistency with re-
spect to two types of 2-person reduced games. According to the first
type, the worth of any single player in the 2-person reduced game is de-
rived from the difference of player’s positive (instead of maximum) sur-
pluses. According to the second type, the worth of any single player in
the 2-person reduced game either coincides with the 2-person max reduced
game or refers to the constrained equal loss rule applied to an appropri-
ate 2-person bankruptcy problem, the claims of which are given by the
player’s positive surpluses.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classifications : 91A12
Keywords : coalitional TU game, kernel, bilateral consistency, converse
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1 Introduction
The kernel is one of the most important solution concepts of transferable util-
ity(TU) games proposed by Davis and Maschler (1965). It has many interesting
properties that reflect in various ways the structure of the game. To understand
a solution concept of cooperative game theory, besides to observe the properties
it preserves, one might focus on its definition and try to interprete it intuitively.
Many attempts at providing an interpretation to the definition of the kernel
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seems to rely on “interpersonal comparison of utility” which is still an obscure
notion for us.
The axiomatic approach is an acceptable way to justify a solution concept of
TU games. Several famous solution concepts of TU games are characterized by
convincing axioms, for instance, the core by Peleg (1986), the Shapley value by
Shapley (1953), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), and the prenucleolus by Sobolev
(1975), etc. The prekernel is the auxiliary solution concept of the kernel and is
characterized by Peleg (1986). Nevertheless, one can not use the same axioms
characterizing the prekernel to justify the kernel.
In the paper, we construct two different bilateral reduced games. Two ax-
iomatic characterizations are provided which are related to these two bilateral
reduced games. These two collections of axioms are the same except the bilat-
eral reduced games employed are different. In particular, The main axioms of
these two characterizations are bilateral consistency and converse consistency.
These two axioms play the same roles as max-consistency and converse max-
consistency in Peleg’s characterization of the prekernel.
Section 2 introduces definitions and conventions. In section 3, we construct
the bilateral min reduced game and provide an axiomatic characterization of the
kernel. In section 4, we use the constrained equal loss bankruptcy rule to create
the bilateral CEL reduced game and provide another axiomatic characterization
of the kernel.
2 Definitions and conventions
Let N be the set of potential players. A coalition is an nonempty finite subset
of N and N denotes the class of all coalitions of N.
A transferable utility game (TU game) with the player set N ∈ N is a
characteristic function v that assigns to each T ⊆ N a real number and v (∅) is
assumed to be 0. The number v (T ) is called the worth of the coalition T . Let
G represent the set of all TU games, that is, G = ∪N∈NGN , where GN denotes
the class of TU games with the player set N. Let |N | be the cardinality of N.
Then v ∈ GN is called a n-player TU game if |N | = n.
Let R be the set of real numbers and by RN the set of all functions from
N to R. We will think of members x of RN as |N |-dimensional vectors whose
coordinates are indexed by members of N ; thus, when i ∈ N, we will write xi
for x(i) and x = (xi)i∈N is called a payoff vector.
Let N 0 be a subset of N . We write xN 0 for the restriction of x on RN
0
,
x(N 0) =
P
i∈N 0
xi, and x (∅) is defined to be 0. For convenience, we will express
the notation v ({i, j, k}) to be v (ijk) and write N 0∪i instead of N 0∪{i}. Denote
b(N) = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N , i 6= j}.
That is, b (N) consists of all 2-player subsets of N.
Let v ∈ GN . We denote
X 0 (v) =
©
x ∈ RN : x (N) ≤ v (N)
ª
,
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and
X (v) =
©
x ∈ RN : x (N) = v (N)
ª
.
Let G0 ⊆ G. A solution σ on G0 is a function which associates with each
game v ∈ G0 a subset σ (v) in X 0 (v) .
σ is called single-valued (SIV A) if |σ (v)| = 1 for every v ∈ G0.
σ satisfies Pareto optimality(PO) if σ (v) ⊆ X (v) for every v ∈ G0.
σ satisfies non-emptiness(NE) if σ (v) 6= ∅ for every v ∈ G0.
σ satisfies individual rationality(IR) if xi ≥ v (i) for all x ∈ σ (v) and for
every v ∈ G0.
We shall be primarily interested in the kernel. Let v ∈ GN . Given a payoff
vector x ∈ RN , x is called an imputation if
x ∈ X (v) and xi ≥ v (i) , for all i ∈ N.
The set of all imputations is denoted to be I (v) . Let G0 be the collection of all
TU games with nonempty imputation set.
Let v ∈ GN . Given a coalition S ⊆ N and a payoff vector x ∈ RN , the
excess ev (S, x) with respect to v, S and x is defined to be
ev (S, x) = v (S)− x (S) ,
For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, we denote the set of coalitions containing i and not j by
Fij . The maximum surplus of player i against player j at payoff vector x is
given by
Sij (v, x) = max
S∈Fij
ev (S, x) .
An imputation x is said to be in the kernel of the game v, denoted to be K (v) ,
if for all k, l ∈ N and k 6= l, either
Skl (v, x) = Slk (v, x) , (1)
or
Skl (v, x) > Slk (v, x) and xl = v (l) .
It is known that the kernel satisfies non-emptiness on G0(see, e.g., Davis and
Maschler (1965)).
As a new, but important tool we introduce the positive surplus of player i
against player j at payoff vector x as follows:
S+ij (v, x) = Sij (v, x) + xi − v (i) .
Note that
S+ij (v, x) = max
Q⊆N\{i,j}
[v(i ∪Q)− x(Q)− v (i)] ≥ 0. (2)
In words S+ij (v, x) is the largest net income that player i can achieve by
cooperation with coalitions not containing player j, provided that players k dif-
ferent from i and j agree to receive their payoff xk for their possible cooperative
behavior.
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Let v ∈ GN0 , N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N) and x ∈ RN . Define the bilateral min
reduced game mrxN 0 (v) of v with respect to N
0 = {i, j} and x as follows:
mrxN 0 (v) (N
0) = v (N)− x(N\N 0),
mrxN 0 (v) (i) = v (i)+min
©
v (N)− x(N\N 0)− v(i)− v (j) ,max £0,S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x)¤ª ,
and
mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j)+min
©
v (N)− x(N\N 0)− v(i)− v (j) ,max £0,S+ji (v, x)− S+ij (v, x)¤ª .
A solution concept σ on G0 has bilateral min− consistency if the following
condition is satisfied: If v ∈ GN0 , N 0 ∈ b(N) and x ∈ σ (v), then mrxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0
and
xN 0 ∈ σ (mrxN 0 (v)) . (3)
A solution concept σ on G0 has converse min − consistency if the following
condition is satisfied: If v ∈ GN0 , x ∈ I (v) and for every N 0 ∈ b (N) mrxN 0 (v) ∈
GN 00 and xN 0 ∈ σ (mrxN 0 (v)), then x ∈ σ (v).
Let τ be a solution defined on 2-player games, that is, ∪|N |=2GN . τ is called
the standard solution if for any v ∈ G{i,j},
τk (v) = v(k) +
1
2
(v(ij)− v (i)− v (j)),
where k = i, j.
A solution σ on G0 satisfies standardness(ST ) if σ = τ on ∪|N |=2G0N .
3 The bilateral min reduced game and the ker-
nel
Let v ∈ GN0 , x ∈ I (v) and N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N). Considering the bilateral min
reduced game mrxN 0 (v), the worth mr
x
N 0 (v) (k), k ∈ N 0 could be interpreted
under the following two situations.
Situation 1: Generally speaking players in N\N 0 are supposed to be paid
according to the imputation x, so each player h in N\N 0 receives at least the
amount xh. Therefore, the bargaining range of i and j is at most
xi + xj − v (i)− v (j) .
Situation 2: Suppose that there is a public project proposed by the govern-
ment. For each S ⊆ N , v (S) can be viewed as the profit the coalition S can
earn by completing this public project. By (2), S+ij (v, x)(or S+ji (v, x)) is the
largest net income that player i(player j) can gain by cooperating with coali-
tions not containing player j(player i). Without loss of generality, suppose that
S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x). We assume that players i and j compete over the public
project. Only one of them can get the public project. Player i could discount
the payment received from the government by the amount S+ji (v, x). Since the
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largest net income of player i exceeds that of player j, player j has no ability
to stop the government to give the public project to player i. Hence, players i,
j will obtain the net income S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x), 0 respectively.
The worth of 1-person coalition of the bilateral min reduced game is derived
under these two situations. In the following, we will use the bilateral min
reduced game to characterize the kernel. First, we introduce that the kernel
satisfies standardness. It is easy to derive the result, we omit the proof.
Lemma 1 K (v) = τ (v) for all v ∈ ∪|N |=2GN0 .
Lemma 2 If v ∈ GN0 and x ∈ I (v), then mrx{i,j} (v) ∈ G{i,j}0 for every i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j.
Proof. Let N 0 = {i, j}. We suppose without loss of generality, due to the
interchangeable roles of player i and player j, that S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x). Then
it follows by construction of the reduced game that it holds that mrxN 0 (v) (j) =
v (j), whereas
mrxN 0 (v) (i) ≤ v (i) + xi + xj − v (i)− v (j)
= xi + xj − v (j) .
Consequently, it holds in general
mrxN 0 (v) (i) +mr
x
N 0 (v) (j) ≤ xi + xj − v (j) + v (j) = mrxN 0 (v) (N 0) ,
so the imputation set of the bilateral reduced game mrxN 0 (v) is always non-
empty. The proof is complete.
We will show that the kernel satisfies bilateral min-consistency and converse
min-consistency. These two axioms play the main roles to characterize the
kernel.
Lemma 3 The kernel satisfies bilateral min-consistency.
Proof. Let v ∈ GN0 , N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N) and x ∈ K (v). By Lemma 2,
mrxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0 . We shall show that xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)). There are two
possibilities to be considered:
Case 1 Sij (v, x) > Sji (v, x) and xj = v (j). It holds that
S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x) > xi − v (i) ≥ 0,
mrxN 0 (v) (i) = xi and mr
x
N 0 (v) (j) = v (j) = xj . Hence, I (mr
x
N 0 (v)) is the
singleton {(xi, xj)} and xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)) .
Case 2 Sij (v, x) = Sji (v, x). We suppose without loss of generality, due to
the interchangeable roles of player i and player j, that S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x).
Then mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j) and
S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x) = xi − v (i)− [xj − v (j)]
≤ xi + xj − v (i)− v (j) .
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We derive that mrxN 0 (v) (i) = xi − xj + v (j). By standardness of the kernel,
K (mrxN 0 (v)) = τ (mr
x
N 0 (v)) = {xN 0}. (4)
We obtain the desired result.
From Cases 1 and 2, the proof is complete.
Lemma 4 The kernel satisfies converse min-consistency.
Proof. Let v ∈ GN0 , x ∈ I (v) , for every N 0 ∈ b (N) mrxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0 and
xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)). We will show that x ∈ K (v). If not, there exists N 0 =
{i, j} ∈ b (N) such that Sij (v, x) > Sji (v, x) and xj > v (j). There are two
cases to be discussed.
Case 1 S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x). Then, mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j). There are two
subcases to be discussed.
Subcase 1 S+ij (v, x)−S+ji (v, x) ≥ xi+xj − v (i)− v (j). Then mrxN 0 (v) (i) =
xi + xj − v (j). We derive that I (mrxN 0 (v)) = {(xi + xj − v (j) , v (j))} and
K (mrxN 0 (v)) = {(xi + xj − v (j) , v (j))} 6= {xN 0} ,
by the assumption that xj > v (j). We obtain the desired contradiction.
Subcase 2 S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x) < xi + xj − v (i)− v (j). Then,
mrxN 0 (v) (i) = v (i) + S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x)
= Sij (v, x)− Sji (v, x) + xi − xj + v (j) .
It holds that,
τ i (mrxN 0 (v)) = xi +
1
2
(Sij (v, x)− Sji (v, x)) > xi (5)
and
τ j (mr
x
N 0 (v)) = xj −
1
2
(Sij (v, x)− Sji (v, x)) < xj . (6)
It violates the assumption that xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)) = τ (mrxN 0 (v)).
Case 2 S+ij (v, x) < S+ji (v, x). Then, mrxN 0 (v) (i) = v (i), and
S+ji (v, x)− S+ij (v, x) = Sji (v, x)− Sij (v, x) + xj − v (j)− (xi − v (i))
< xi + xj − v (i)− v (j) .
Hence, mrxN 0 (v) (j) = Sji (v, x)−Sij (v, x) + xj − xi + v (i). We derive that (5)
and (6) hold. We obtain the desired contradiction. By Cases 1 and 2, the proof
is complete.
Theorem 5 The kernel is the unique solution on G0 satisfying Pareto optimal-
ity, non-emptiness, individual rationality, standardness, bilateral min-consistency
and converse min-consistency.
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Proof. It is known that the kernel satisfies PO, NE, IR. By Lemmas 1, 3
and 4, the kernel satisfies standardness, bilateral min-consistency and converse
min-consistency. We will show the uniqueness part.
Let σ be a solution on G0 satisfying PO, NE, IR, ST, bilateral min-consistency
and converse min-consistency. Let v ∈ G0. There are three cases to be consid-
ered:
Case 1 v is a 1-player game. By PO and NE, it holds that K (v) = σ (v).
Case 2 v is a 2-player game. By ST, K (v) = τ (v) = σ (v).
Case 3 v ∈ ∪|N|>2GN0 . Let x ∈ K (v). By bilateral min-consistency, for each
N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N),
xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)) = τ (mrxN 0 (v)) = σ (mrxN 0 (v)) (7)
Since σ satisfies converse min-consistency, x ∈ σ (v). We obtain that K (v) ⊆
σ (v).
Let x ∈ σ (v). By IR and PO, x ∈ I (v). By bilateral min-consistency,
for each N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N), (7) holds. Since the kernel satisfies converse
min-consistency, x ∈ K (v). We obtain that σ (v) ⊆ K (v), and σ (v) = K (v).
From Cases 1,2 and 3, we complete the proof.
4 The constrained equal loss rule and the kernel
In this section, we will construct a bilateral reduced game by means of the
constrained equal loss(CEL) rule. It is called the bilateral CEL reduced
game. We will show that the kernel can be characterized by the same axioms
in Theorem 5 except that the bilateral min reduced game is replaced by the
bilateral CEL reduced game. First, let us recall the constrained equal loss rule
for bankruptcy problems.
An n-person bankruptcy problem is a pair (E, d) with a finite set of claimants
N = {1, 2, · · ·, n}, where the estate E ≥ 0 and the nonnegative claim-vector
d = (d1, d2, · · ·, dn) satisfy d (N) > E. The constrained equal loss rule is defined
by:
CELk (E, d) = max[0, dk − λ],
for all k ∈ N , where λ solves the equation Σ
k∈N
max[0, dk − λ] = E. This rule is
very ancient. For reference, please see Thomson(2003).
In the sequel we make use of the following two properties of the CEL rule
for 2-person bankruptcy problems (E, (di, dj)) where di ≥ dj :
(P1) CEL(E, (di, dj)) = (E, 0) whenever di − dj ≥ E.
(P2) CEL(E, (di, dj)) = (di − dj + α, α) whenever di − dj ≤ E, where α =
(E − (di − dj)) /2.
Let x ∈ RN be a payoff vector and v ∈ GN . The max reduced game rxN 0 (v)
of v with respect to N 0 ⊂ N and x proposed by Davis and Maschler(1965) is
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defined in the following:
rxN 0 (v) (T ) =



v (N)− x(N\N 0), T = N 0,
max
Q⊆N 0C
[v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)], ∅ 6= T ( N 0,
0, T = ∅.
(8)
Note that
Sij (v, x) = rx{i,j} (v) (i)− xi
and
Sji (v, x) = rx{i,j} (v) (j)− xj .
Let N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N). By the definition of the bilateral max reduced
game, it holds that rxN 0 (v) (k)− v (k) ≥ 0 for k = i, j.
Notice that the imputation set of the bilateral max reduced game rxN 0 (v)
is non-empty if and only if v (N) − x (N\N 0) ≥ rxN 0 (v) (i) + rxN 0 (v) (j). If
I (rxN 0 (v)) = ∅, it holds that
v (N)− x (N\N 0)− v (i)− v (j) < rxN 0 (v) (i)− v (i) + rxN 0 (v) (j)− v (j)(9)
= S+ij (v, x) + S+ji (v, x) .
In case I (rxN 0 (v)) = ∅, we adapt the individual worths in the bilateral CEL
reduced game by applying the CEL rule to the following 2-person bankruptcy
problem:
Bij (v, x) :=
¡
v (N)− x (N\N 0)− v (i)− v (j) , (S+ij (v, x) ,S+ji (v, x))
¢
.
The 2-person bankruptcy problem Bij (v, x) is well-defined due to (9) and
S+ij (v, x) ,S+ji (v, x) are non-negative.
The bilateral CEL reduced game crxN 0 with respect to v, x and N
0 = {i, j} ∈
b (N) is defined as follows: crxN 0 (v) (N
0) = v (N)− x (N\N 0) and for k ∈ N 0,
crxN 0 (v) (k) =
½
CELk (Bij (v, x)) + v (k) , if I (rxN 0 (v)) = ∅,
rxN 0 (v) (k) o.w.
Remark 6 Let x ∈ I (v). If I (rxN 0 (v)) 6= ∅, then crxN 0 (v) = rxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0 . If
I (rxN 0 (v)) = ∅, then crxN 0 (v) (i) + crxN 0 (v) (j) = xi + xj. Hence the imputation
set I (crxN 0 (v)) shrinks to a singleton
n
(crxN 0 (v) (k))k∈{i,j}
o
, and crxN 0 (v) ∈
GN 00 .
Bilateral CEL− consistency and converse CEL− consistency are defined
as the same as bilateral min-consistency and converse min-consistency except
that the bilateral CEL reduced game is employed.
The following Lemma is easy to derive, we omit the proof.
Lemma 7 Let v, v0 ∈ G{i,j}. If v ({i, j}) = v0 ({i, j}) and v (i)− v0 (i) = v (j)−
v0 (j) then τ (v) = τ (v0).
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The following Lemma states a strong relation between the bilateral min
reduced game and the bilateral CEL reduced game.
Lemma 8 Suppose that v ∈ GN0 , N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N) and x ∈ I (v) . Then
crxN 0 (v) (N
0) = mrxN 0 (v) (N
0) and
crxN 0 (v) (i)−mrxN 0(v) (i) = crxN 0 (v) (j)−mrxN 0(v) (j) . (10)
Proof. It is easy to see that crxN 0 (v) (N
0) = mrxN 0 (v) (N
0) = xi + xj . We will
show that (10) holds. There are two cases to be discussed.
Case 1 I (rxN 0 (v)) 6= ∅. Then rxN 0 (v) (i) + rxN 0 (v) (j) ≤ xi + xj , and
S+ij (v, x) + S+ji (v, x) = rxN 0 (v) (i)− v (i) + rxN 0 (v) (j)− v (j)
≤ xi − v (i) + xj − v (j) .
We suppose without loss of generality, due to the interchangeable roles of player
i and player j, that S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x). Then mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j) and
mrxN 0 (v) (i) = v (i) + S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x)
= Sij (v, x) + xi − Sji (v, x)− xj + v (j)
= rxN 0 (v) (i)− rxN 0 (v) (j) +mrxN 0 (v) (j)
= crxN 0 (v) (i)− crxN 0 (v) (j) +mrxN 0 (v) (j) .
Hence, (10) holds.
Case 2 I (rxN 0 (v)) = ∅. We suppose without loss of generality, due to the
interchangeable roles of player i and player j, that S+ij (v, x) ≥ S+ji (v, x). Then
mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j) . There are two subcases to be considered.
Subcase 1 If S+ij (v, x)−S+ji (v, x) ≥ xi+xj − v (i)− v (j) , then by property
(P1) of the CEL rule it follows that
(CELk (Bij (v, x)))k∈N 0 = (xi + xj − v (i)− v (j) , 0) .
We derive that
mrxN 0 (v) (i) = xi + xj − v (j)
= CELi (Bij (v, x)) + v (i)
= crxN 0 (v) (i)
and mrxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j) = cr
x
N 0 (v) (j) . We obtain that (10) holds.
Subcase 2 If S+ij (v, x)−S+ji (v, x) < xi+xj − v (i)− v (j), then by property
(P2) of the CEL rule it follows that
(CELk (Bij (v, x)))k∈N 0 =
¡S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x) + α, α¢ ,
where α = 12
¡
xi + xj − v (i)− v (j)−
¡S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x)¢¢. Then
crxN 0 (v) (i) = v (i) + S+ij (v, x)− S+ji (v, x) + α = mrxN 0 (v) (i) + α
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and
crxN 0 (v) (j) = v (j) + d = mr
x
N 0 (v) (j) + α.
Hence, (10) holds.
From Cases 1 and 2, we complete the proof.
Next, we shall show that the kernel satisfies bilateral CEL-consistency and
converse CEL-consistency.
Lemma 9 The kernel satisfies bilateral CEL-consistency.
Proof. Let v ∈ GN0 , N 0 = {i, j} ∈ b (N) and x ∈ K (v). By Remark 6,
crxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0 . We shall show that xN 0 ∈ K (crxN 0 (v)). Since the kernel
satisfies bilateral min-consistency, it holds that
xN 0 ∈ K (mrxN 0 (v)) = τ (mrxN 0 (v)) = τ (crxN 0 (v)) = K (crxN 0 (v))
by Lemmas 7 and 8.
Lemma 10 The kernel satisfies converse CEL-consistency.
Proof. Let v ∈ GN0 , x ∈ I (v) , for every N 0 ∈ b (N) crxN 0 (v) ∈ GN
0
0 and
xN 0 ∈ K (crxN 0 (v)). We will show that x ∈ K (v). It holds that
xN 0 ∈ K (crxN 0 (v)) = τ (crxN 0 (v)) = τ (mrxN 0 (v)) = K (mrxN 0 (v))
for every N 0 ∈ b (N). Since the kernel satisfies converse min-consistency, we
derive that x ∈ K (v) .
Using the same arguments of Theorem 5, we have the following result.
Theorem 11 The kernel is the unique solution on G0 satisfying Pareto optimal-
ity, non-emptiness, individual rationality, standardness, bilateral CEL-consistency
and converse CEL-consistency.
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